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the American Revolution 
 
 
Jay Feyerabend 
 
 
 
In early June 1775, three ships, the Margaretta, Unity, and 
Polly sailed up the muddy waters of the Machias River toward the 
small, isolated town of Machias in present-day Maine. The Boston-
based vessels Unity and Polly frequently traded lumber with 
colonists in Machias. This time, however, the British warship 
Margaretta accompanied the two schooners to protect the ships 
from the colonists, who presumably had received the news of the 
recent tension in Boston. The three ships laid anchor at Machias’ 
wharf to trade provisions such as “salt, pork and flour” with the 
residents of Machias in exchange for lumber, the industry that drove 
economic life in Machias.1 Increasingly disdainful of the British, the 
colonists were increasingly less inclined to provide the British with 
lumber because, as many of the colonists correctly thought, the 
British army would use lumber to build barracks for the army’s siege 
of Boston. After days of tense negotiations with Ichabod Jones, the 
Tory owner of the Polly and Unity, the colonial representatives and 
British officials agreed to a trade deal. This development angered 
the more fervently patriotic residents of Machias who perceived this 
trade agreement to be coercive and unfair. Ultimately, the colonists’ 
anti-British sentiments prevailed when an angry mob of 
approximately thirty men stormed a church in which Jones and the 
British officer Captain Moore were present.     
 After narrowly escaping from the mob of colonists, Jones 
retreated into the Maine woods. British sailors rescued Captain 
Moore and took him aboard the war ship Margaretta. Once on the 
Margaretta, Moore threatened to burn the town if the colonists kept 
Jones from making the trade. Unimpressed with the firepower of the 
Margaretta, the colonists rejected the order and stormed the Unity 
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and Polly. Led by prominent lumberjack Jerimiah O’Brien, the 
colonists quickly gained control of the Unity and fired on the 
Margaretta. After exchanges of pistol and musket fire, the 
Margaretta pulled up its anchor and retreated up river. After 
anchoring up river for the night, Captain Moore realized he had 
failed to protect the trade interests of Ichabod Jones, who was still 
hiding in the woods. Moore decided to forego the mission and sail 
back toward Machias Bay. Jerimiah O’Brien and the colonists, 
however, had other ideas. As the Margaretta tried to escape toward 
the sea, the Unity rammed into the Margaretta, then the colonists 
swiftly stormed the ship’s deck. After intense close-range, hand-to-
hand combat, the outnumbered British finally submitted and the 
colonists captured the Margaretta and returned to Machias “in great 
triumph, with their colors flying.”2 Incidents such as the one at 
Machias, according to one historian, preceded a complex and 
multifaceted naval conflict during the American Revolution.3 The 
patriotic spirit of men like Jerimiah O’Brien and the “Machias Sons 
of Liberty” suggests that regardless of their position, these men 
deliberately chose to fight for independence. 
The “Machias Sons of Liberty” anecdote aligns with the 
standard historical narrative about colonial rebellion against British 
tyranny. At the conclusion of the French and Indian War, Great 
Britain implemented a series of taxes, which colonists deemed 
unfair and oppressive in light of the Enlightenment.4 On the 
contrary, the British viewed these taxes as just and necessary means 
of protecting colonists and their interests (both on land and sea). In 
response to British taxation, colonists made a conscious choice 
either to split from the crown, or to remain British subjects.  
Privateers fought in the war for complex, nuanced reasons. 
This paper starts from the assumption that privateers were 
influential in the naval theater of the war, one on which historians 
have reached a consensus. Using both the Official Naval Documents 
from the American Revolution and firsthand accounts from sailors, 
this essay will explore the financial aspects of privateering and 
examine the political sentiments of sailors. The paper will examine 
the various perceptions of the role of privateers, and how those 
perceptions differed among politicians in the Continental Congress, 
military officials, and the privateers themselves. Contemporaries 
believed that monetary gain rather than patriotism more likely 
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motivated the privateers. Although contemporaries likely would 
have believed that privateers were patriots and privateers had 
secondary motivations to join the war, the privateers’ motivations 
were mostly of financial self-interest. Finally, the paper will assess 
the general effectiveness of privateers (as understood by their 
contemporaries) versus the effectiveness of the Continental Navy, 
drawing a clearer picture of the role privateers played during the 
American Revolution. The Continental Congress regarded the 
privateers as a valuable tool in their arsenal in fighting the British 
navy, and the privateers’ involvement was a significant 
consideration in Congress’ calculation and execution of strategies 
for effectively waging war against Great Britain. 
 Historians generally have reached a consensus on the 
influence of privateering on the American war effort, but they 
continue to debate whether patriotism or monetary gain motivated 
the privateers. Historical debate on the importance of privateering 
in the American Revolution began with Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The 
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. Referencing 
George Washington’s dependence on the French Navy, Mahan 
argues that the commissioned navies were far more significant to the 
maritime war than the privateers. In response to Mahan, Edgar 
Stanton Maclay asserts that privateering was in fact an important, 
even “dominating,” and legitimate form of naval warfare because 
privateering influenced the circulation of important supplies.5 In 
further support of Maclay’s argument, Reuben Stivers emphasizes 
the privateers’ patriotism through his portrayal of them as a 
“Volunteer Navy,” while in contrast, Carl Swanson argues that a 
desire for money primarily—perhaps singularly—motivated men to 
become privateers. According to Swanson, there is minimal 
evidence to suggest that patriotic resistance to British tyranny 
motivated privateers.6 
 
Economic Allure of Privateering 
 
 Patriotic fervor and disdain for coercive British policies, as 
in the case of “The Machias Sons of Liberty,” first inspired some 
men to take up arms against the powerful Royal Navy. Patriotic 
sentiments, however, probably did not convince all colonists to 
continue waging war against the British. For both privateers and the 
3
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Continental Navy, the financial appeal of the war influenced sailors’ 
decisions about joining the war. As it became increasingly evident 
that America’s struggle for independence would require a prolonged 
war against the British, a major concern for men (and their families) 
determined to contribute to the war effort centered on how 
individuals would be financially compensated for their efforts while 
away from their homes—often for extended periods of time. 
Agreeing to fight against British rule was more than a patriotic 
decision, as this commitment influenced a sailors’ ability to earn a 
living from his pre-war occupation. Men who wanted to become 
sailors during the late 1770s faced two primary options: either join 
the newly formed Continental Navy or join a privateering vessel 
commissioned by the Continental Congress or more commonly by 
state governments.  
While the salary promised to the sailors by the Continental 
Congress was a reliable source of income, the potential to make 
great deals of money through privateering was a much more 
attractive prospect to many.  Sailors in the Continental Navy 
typically received a salary of five dollars, and officers and seamen 
split one third of the prizes from ships they seized.7 As historian 
James Volo explains, “in most cases simple economic self-interest 
spurred these patriots to serve by the hundreds in private warships 
from 1775 to 1783. So popular was privateering that the regular 
navy had trouble recruiting and keeping crews.”8 This 
overwhelming trend toward privateering suggests financial motives 
strongly outweighed the desire to fight with the continental forces. 
Sailor Jacob Nagle’s writings support this claim. In his journal, 
Nagle claimed to have taken in nine prizes in May and June 1780 
while sailing on the Fair American and twenty-one prizes while on 
the Rising Son from July 1781 through October 1781. Though Nagle 
did not state the specific amount in his journal, historian John Dann 
surmises that Nagle earned hundreds of British pounds as a 
privateer. Since American privateers were capturing many ships, 
Nagle certainly was not the only sailor making large sums of money. 
Many colonists who observed the money-making potential of 
privateering—but were not capable of joining crews—became 
involved by investing in the financial support of a vessel. 
Letters and other historical documents during this period 
provide some insight into the amount of bounty that privateers 
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seized. Dr. James Warren wrote to John Adams in August 1776 to 
inform him of the amount of goods taken as prizes by privateers—
goods that were ultimately sold in Boston during the summer of 
1776: “We have nothing going forward here but fixing out 
privateers, and condemnation and sale of prizes sent in by them, so 
many that I am quite lost in my estimate of them, and West India 
goods are falling at a great rate. Yesterday arrived a prize taken by 
at [New] York Privateers with several hundred bags of cotton.” 
Warren’s tone suggests that privateering was a constant source of 
income, which was not particularly interesting to Adams. Not 
mentioning the cost of “fixing out privateers” also suggests that the 
cost of doing so was not very significant.9 
John Avery wrote to President John Hancock of the 
Continental Congress explaining how Massachusetts is “intirely 
exhausted of commissions Instructions and Bonds for Armed 
vessels & call for them seems to increase therefore Should be greatly 
obliged to you if you would forward a Number of them of them for 
the Use of this State.”10 From this letter it can be inferred that 
privateering was growing in popularity.  Moreover, it was not just 
Massachusetts that was exhausting its bonds and commission 
instructions. The call for privateering apparently occurred 
throughout many of the American colonies. One such example 
involves North Carolina. 
The state of North Carolina was especially liberal in its 
policies regarding privateering; sailors were entitled to keep one-
half of goods taken from merchant ships. If a crew captured a British 
vessel, then the crew split the bounty among themselves, minus a 
fee.11 This incentive certainly would have enticed sailors living near 
the North Carolina shores (and possessing a proclivity to support the 
American cause) to join a privateering vessel and reap the rewards.   
 
Privateers’ Political Sentiments 
 
Whether sailors pursued an independent nation via their 
involvement in privateering is a different question, as personal 
motivations and sentiments may or may not have aligned within the 
broader goals of earning Independence for the Colonies. Although 
there is evidence for the pursuit of economic benefits, there is scarce 
evidence of sailors’ political sentiments. As a result, it is difficult to 
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say whether sailors regarded themselves as patriots or loyalists. It 
must be remembered that colonists cannot be neatly segmented into 
two distinct parties of patriots and loyalists. The case of Jacob Nagle 
serves as an example. 
Jacob Nagle served in the Continental Army and Navy and 
on numerous vessels as a privateer. He thoroughly documented his 
sentiments and beliefs in a journal. While the entries illuminate his 
perspective on his role in the war, what they do not address is of 
critical importance. He does not reflect on political theory or provide 
updates on the land war, which he would have learned about during 
his time on privateering vessels.  
When violence erupted at Lexington and Concord in 1775, 
the thirteen-year-old Nagle was traveling from his hometown of 
Reading, Pennsylvania to the American Barracks outside 
Philadelphia with his father, George Nagle.  Jacob’s father accepted 
a role in 1776 as major in the 5th Pennsylvania Regiment. His 
father’s prominence in the military probably influenced how the 
young Nagle viewed the war.  Following his visit to Philadelphia, 
Nagle returned to Reading for about a year until his father sent for 
him and he joined the Army as a regular soldier. Nagle remained in 
the Colonial Army until the summer of 1778. Little is known about 
Nagle’s time between leaving the Army and joining the crew of the 
Fair American, a privateering vessel.12 However, it is believed that 
Jacob Nagle might have spent roughly six weeks in the Continental 
Navy serving on the Saratoga, where he likely received basic sailing 
skills under the command of Captain Young prior to joining the Fair 
American.13 At a time when the Continental Navy struggled to 
recruit sailors, Captain Young’s willingness to allow Nagle leave for 
a private vessel strongly suggests that naval commanders 
understood the effectiveness of privateering and viewed privateers 
as an integral part of the war effort while still realizing the fiscal 
benefits of privateering. 
Prior to his brief stint in the Continental Navy, Nagle 
planned to sail for Europe before his parents forbade it. Nagle’s 
desire to leave North America suggests that his service in the army 
may have had more to do with his parents’ wishes than his own 
political inclinations. Although Nagle sailed on various privateering 
vessels, his journal curiously does not mention the war except when 
he and other sailors from The Trumbull were traveling by land to 
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Philadelphia and looking for quarters to spend the evening on their 
journey. Nagle and the other sailors found “a farm housed about a 
mile on the road, but he could not tell weather he would give us 
entertainment or not, as he new he was a rank, but he told us not to 
let on that we had seen him, as he would be there by dark, and if we 
would be Tories for one night, he had no doubt but what we would 
be well treated.”14 If privateers truly regarded themselves as 
American patriots, one would expect Nagle mention the land war or 
at least comment on other sailors’ conversations about it.  By not 
mentioning the land war in his journal, even after he served time in 
the Continental Army, Nagle might not have thought the land war 
was as significant as his work on various privateering vessels. 
Privateers seemed to take more pride in their privateering 
than in fighting for political freedom. For example, Hohn Manly, a 
privateer operating out of Philadelphia, became a national hero for 
his exploits as a privateer. When Manly entered a port, the local 
newspaper regarded the event as newsworthy. In 1776, a ballad 
titled “Manly: A Favourite New Song in the American Fleet” was 
recorded. Some lines from the song include “Brave Manly his is 
stout, and his men have proved true,” and “To Him and all those 
valiant Souls who go in Privateers.”15 It stands to reason that serving 
on a privateering vessel excited those who were seeking this type of 
adventure. Privateers and those related to privateering regarded the 
profession as honorable. Further, it appears that privateering was not 
perceived as piracy; neither the private journal of Jacob Nagle nor 
any official documents from the continental or state legislatures 
described privateering in the same manner as the illegal act of 
piracy—an activity which was regarded with great disdain at the 
time.   
There were, however, other reasons why men might have 
chosen to become privateers. During the late 1770s both state 
militias and the Continental Army drafted soldiers to ensure there 
were enough for the war effort. One way men could avoid 
conscription was by volunteering to serve on a privateering vessel. 
While the living standards on privateering vessels were not 
desirable, it might have been well understood that life on a 
privateering ship—and the spoils associated with it—would have 
been preferable to serving in the army and living in the 
encampments. This further supports the notion that men opted to 
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become privateers not due to patriotic support for independence, but 
rather to avoid life in the army (coupled with the potential to earn 
great rewards). 
Privateers likely chose their profession for a myriad of 
reasons.  Whether to seek riches, avoid service in the American 
army, or simply to pursue adventure, privateers held a variety of 
motivations which were not strictly patriotic. Moreover, it is 
reasonable to assume that men serving on privateering ships may 
have regarded their service as simply a way to continue providing 
for their families when they no longer could be regular sailors as 
they were before the war. To these men, earning a living might have 
been more important than serving a political cause.   
 
Privateers’ Role in Congress’ Naval Strategy 
 
The freedom-seeking politicians in Philadelphia understood 
the popularity of privateering and likely seized on the opportunity 
to leverage (non-political) privateers for the war effort. Nagle’s 
experience as a privateer is likely representative of many of his 
contemporaries’ time aboard ship. Whether driven by a desire to 
serve their country or to earn money for their families, privateers 
contributed to the American cause. This contribution is most evident 
in Congress’ use of privateers to disrupt British supply lines and to 
gather critical matériel for the American cause. 
Without the financial means to lure sailors away from 
profitable private ventures, the Continental Congress decided that 
using privateers to wreak havoc on British vessels—rather than 
building official Naval ships—was more financially viable. Because 
building and maintaining a congressional navy was very expensive, 
the size of the navy was small compared to the number of privateers 
on the water. Estimates of the number of men in the Navy range 
from six-hundred in 1775 to roughly four thousand around 1777, 
with an average of under two thousand sailors per year between the 
years of 1775 and 1782.16 Although accurate records substantiating 
the actual number of privateers during those years are difficult to 
come by, many historians believe those numbers were in fact 
significantly higher.  
Congressional legislation empowered both the Continental 
Congress and state congresses to grant Letters of Marque. These 
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were permits for colonial vessels to engage in privateering activities 
in exchange for two-thirds of the prize acquired by the vessel.17 This 
was a compelling proposition for colonial governments, as they 
would not shoulder any of the financial burden of procuring ships 
and preparing the vessels for their voyages. Wealthy individuals or 
investment groups assumed the risks and costs of putting ships to 
sea. Historians continue to speculate on the percentage of Letters of 
Marque that the Continental Congress versus state legislatures 
granted. Historian Sidney Morse, for example, claims that the 
Continental Congress—rather than the state legislatures—actually 
granted substantial number of Letters of Marques (or bonds).18 State 
legislatures nonetheless played a significant part. The Massachusetts 
House of Representatives, for example, also staunchly supported 
privateering; they documented as much by writing “permit as many 
Persons, within their Limits, as they shall think proper, to fit out 
Privateers and the sd Comee are also hereby directed to 
commissionate such Officers as they shall judge suitable for the 
above purpose.”19 The legislature placed no limits on the number of 
ships receiving Letters of Marque. This decision indicates that 
Massachusetts Representatives deemed privateering to be a 
necessary practice. 
 Pennsylvania politicians seemed to come to a similar 
conclusion. Understanding the financial motivations of privateers, 
colonial legislators had to grapple with sailors switching sides and 
joining the British for financial gain. The Pennsylvania Committee 
of Safety stipulated the official punishment for treason on March 26, 
1776 under the suspicion that “wicked and ill-disposed persons have 
seduced and inticed some of the Men belonging to the Boats, to 
desert the service and go into other employ.” The records then 
continue, “[anyone] who shall harbour and Conceal any Deserter 
(knowing him to be such) from the Continental Forces, or any other 
Forces raised within this or any other of the United Colonies, for the 
Defence of America, shall forfeit and pay any sum not exceeding 
fifty nor less than thirty Dollars, or suffer three months 
imprisonment.”20 In effect, Pennsylvania was “cracking down” on 
privateers that showed no loyalty to the American cause. 
Nevertheless, privateers were critical to the war effort. 
 
Effectiveness of Privateers and the Continental Navy 
9
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 Before the French government decided in 1778 to send a 
fleet of twelve ships to support the American cause, privateers were 
the colonies’ main naval defense against the British. Privateers 
experienced overwhelming success in the early parts of the war. In 
December 1775, Vice Admiral Samuel Graves of the Royal Navy 
wrote to Major General William Howe, “I wish it was in my power 
to give your Excellency more satisfaction on the Subject of your 
Letter,” updating Howe on the effectiveness of the Royal Navy. 
Graves continues, “It is impossible for the Ships to keep on their 
stations or prevent the Rebels from making further captures.”21 
Additionally, Graves informed Phillip Stephens that “the Rebels 
watch the opportunity of the Kings Ships and Vessels being off the 
Coast, slip out in light good going Vessels full of Men, seize a 
defenceless Merchant ship and push immediately for the nearest 
Port the Wind will carry them.”22 Graves’ outline of a basic strategy 
for privateers as early as 1775 serves as evidence that privateering 
was common. Graves’ decision to write to his colleagues in England 
about privateering further suggests that privateering significantly 
challenged the British forces. 
Privateers held many advantages over the formation and 
maintenance of a standing navy.  The lack of funding and the 
relatively small number of vessels made organization of a 
Continental squadron improbable. According to Volo, “Although 
small squadrons of American Privateers sometimes acted in concert, 
a lack of equipment and seamen for manning the more powerful 
Continental frigates suggests that the hope of combing the 
operations of their widely scattered warships was wildly ambitious.” 
The Continental and State Navies did not have the leadership to 
operate as a cohesive unit. Volo further describes the “largest 
American Naval Operation” in 1779 as “an utmost disaster because 
it lacked both experienced leadership and an appropriate operational 
strategy.”23 It was for these reasons that politicians relied heavily on 
privateers to establish a legitimate naval presence in the Atlantic 
Ocean. 
Privateering, however, was not an easy task—and was 
certainly not without risk. Nevertheless, early privateers 
experienced meaningful success during the early parts of the war; 
this was largely due to the skill and experience of the captains, 
10
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coupled with their familiarity of the coastal waters. Vice Admiral 
Richard Lord Howe describes the risk in his letter of 1777 to Phillip 
Stephens: “Several Privateers have been chased by different 
Cuizers: But from the better sailing –State in which the former can 
with facility kept, and other local Advantages, Without Effect.”24  In 
many instances, captains of privateering vessels had been working 
in the maritime industry for many years prior to the start of the 
American Revolution and were very familiar with sailing in North 
American waters. Privateers also commonly used vessels that were 
lighter, faster and featured greater maneuverability as compared to 
their British counterparts.25 These factors were critical in terms of 
engaging and outmaneuvering their opponents.  During the early 
periods of the American Revolution, these successes at sea were 
some of the Americans’ only victories. Without the optimism the 
privateers were providing for the rebel cause, General Washington 
would have faced greater challenges in the war effort, especially in 
the recruitment of men. 
Although Congress did not regulate them, privateering ships 
did create some problems. First, the reliability and loyalty of 
Privateers was a constant cause for concern. As Jacob Nagle writes 
in his journal, “[I] belonged to a passenger in the schooner and was 
not in the bill of laden. That private property he smuggled and put 
in his own pocket. Being ready, we took in a cargo of sugar and 
coffee, and the rest in Spacia, and put to see.”26 Nagle is explaining 
the act of smuggling that was all too common among privateers. 
Vessels like the one Nagle described would capture British goods 
and sell them without making any governmental authorities aware 
of the capture. If privateers smuggled cargo, then they would not 
have to pay a percentage to the government as outlined in the Letter 
of Marque. This willingness to break the law for fiscal gain shows 
that the first motive of privateers was to make money, as opposed to 
supporting the broader cause of winning the war.  
 The Continental Congress also struggled with treasonous 
sailors such as John Goodrich, a wealthy merchant from 
Portsmouth, Virginia. Goodrich and his son understood that 
privateers could profit from the war regardless of which side they 
supported. The Goodrich family was ultimately responsible for the 
capture of over 100 American ships. Following the British retreat 
from New York City, John Goodrich and his son sailed for England, 
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where they received a pension for their efforts in disrupting 
American commerce. Goodrich was not the only Englishman 
involved in privateering; British privateers commonly captured 
ships off the coast of Europe. This was explained by William 
McCreery in an October 10, 1777 letter to John Adams: “The 
Carolinians have been peculiarly unlucky of late in the vessels 
which they Sent to Europe. Four out of five which got into the Bay 
were taken, & I Saw a Letter from Cadiz yesterday.”27 
 By 1777, the British were becoming more familiar with 
American privateering tactics and made strategic adjustments.  In 
his December 4 letter to William Bingham, Robert Morris writes 
how he believed British merchant ships had armed themselves: “to 
counter this display force, he recommends a Stout Privateer because 
I imagine the British ships will now come out very generally Armed 
and little will be done to the small ones.”28 Privateering was 
becoming more difficult, expensive, and dangerous as British ships 
began arming themselves in anticipation of engaging privateers.  
This adjustment by the British likely had some impact on the 
effectiveness of American privateering efforts and ultimately led to 
a greater reliance on the French fleet as the war progressed. 
Although privateers became less influential following France’s 
intervention in the war, the significance of the practice during the 
initial years of the war cannot be understated. Privateering provided 
the American rebels with the necessary funds and supplies to sustain 
the fight against the British.   
Studying the privateers complicates the patriot-loyalist 
narrative about the American Revolution. Critics of this claim might 
argue that many participants in the American Revolution fought for 
high-minded liberal principles. In one of the foremost scholarly 
examples of this interpretation, historian Gordon S. Wood argues 
that the Enlightenment writings of John Locke and Thomas Paine 
ignited the animosity of the American colonists toward British 
oppression, leading to the fight for independence from the British 
Empire.29    
In a more critical approach to the American Revolution, the 
struggle for independence in colonial America was more parochial. 
The war was fought by countless ordinary people whose names have 
been lost to history. They lived their lives while embracing their 
beliefs and values. The privateers exemplified these soldiers.  They 
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were foremost working professionals—sailors, as it were, similar to 
other skilled tradesmen, merchants, or planters.  And like those men 
in other professions, their main goal during the 1770s was to provide 
for their families while making a healthy living during a period of 
intense political and economic uncertainty. This is not to suggest 
that no privateer was sympathetic to the cause of American liberty. 
But the historical evidence suggests quite a few of these men were 
primarily seizing the opportunity to get rich, and it would have been 
fortuitous that this endeavor aligned with their political leanings.  
From a different vantage point on privateers, political elites 
viewed the privateers as a tool in the fight against British tyranny, 
and were making strategic decisions about fighting the war based on 
the value of privateers. While the perceived nature of privateers adds 
insight to the historical record, the political elites would not have 
been concerned with how privateers saw themselves, and the 
privateers would have been largely disinterested in how the political 
class perceived them. The political elites would have grasped the 
immense value of privateers, and likely worried (to some degree) 
about the precedent of piracy being set in the waters off the 
American coastline that might continue after the war.  However, it 
is reasonable to assert that the political class accepted this situation 
and determined that post-war precedents regarding privateering 
could be handled another day—that is, after the war had been won. 
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